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Abstract / Summary 
             To support cooperative purchasing within the United Nations we carried out an 
empirical study in 2004, mainly to define cooperation forms, and to identify and rank 
motives and critical factors for cooperation. Important reasons to work together turn out 
to be lower prices and transaction costs, sharing information, and learning. Reasons not to 
work together are i.e. lack of opportunity or priority to purchase cooperatively. Most of 
the literature in the area of critical factors focuses on factors such as trust and support. 
Based on our study, we also emphasize the importance of choosing the right products and 
services. Furthermore, we observe what we call the hitchhikers’ dilemma. This dilemma 
deals with small agencies hitchhiking on contracts from large agencies. For large agen-
cies there may be no incentive to allow hitchhiking. For small agencies hitchhiking can 
be very interesting though. Possible solutions to this problem are savings allocation 
mechanisms. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research. 
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Introduction 
 
Cooperation is as old as the human society and has been studied extensively (Harrigan, 1985; 
Hakansson, 1987; Kamann, 2004). Cooperating in the specific field of purchasing is as old as 
ancient Egypt and Babylon (Wooten, 2003). The recent attention to the concept of cooperative 
purchasing as we know it goes back to the cooperation between farmers in 19th century 
England. Here cooperative purchasing is defined as the sharing or bundling of purchasing 
related information, experiences, processes, resources or volumes to improve the performance 
of all participating organisations.  
Despite its long history, cooperative purchasing has received relatively little attention 
in (purchasing) management research (Laing, 1997; Mudambi, 2004). The lack of research 
attention seems unjustified with cooperative purchasing being more and more well-established 
(Doucette, 1997; Major, 1997; Nollet, 2003; Sickinger, 1996). Therefore it is useful to search 
for differences and to validate insights from general alliance and collaboration literature 
applied to the specific context of cooperative purchasing. 
Reasons indicated for the trend to more cooperative purchasing are shifting agendas 
from a short-term view and internal focus to a long-term view and external relationship focus, 
e-procurement developments, increased competition, and an increased awareness and 
importance of purchasing activities (Arnold, 1982; Dobler, 1996; Essig, 2000; Leenders, 1998; 
Lindner, 1983; Schotanus, 2004). These reasons are identified by many different organi-
sations. One system of such a set of organisations is the United Nations (UN) system. The UN 
have been practicing and studying cooperative purchasing for decades now. To provide 
recommendations for future UN policy on the topic of cooperative purchasing we carried out 
an empirical study in 2004. The overall goal of this study was to analyse current and future 
practices of cooperative purchasing in the UN. 
 
About the United Nations 
 
In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met to draw up the United Nations Charter. The main 
purposes of the UN are to maintain international peace and security, and to cooperate in 
solving international problems. Today, nearly every nation in the world belongs to the UN, 
with membership now at 191 countries (UN, 2005).  
The UN system encompasses a wide variety of organisations such as UNICEF and 
the World Health Organisation, and covers a $5,084 billion procurement market (IAPSO, 
2003). Each of the larger agencies has their own procurement entities with different structures. 
Many UN agencies have also delegated authority to their respective country offices to 
undertake procurement up to a certain financial limit (Walker, 2004). This complex set of 
massive, multinational, very political organisations is reputedly bureaucratic. Consequently, 
opportunities for change in procurement are considerable, but fraught with difficulties.  
Despite the different activities and sizes of the UN agencies there are many of the 
same (common) goods and services purchased by most of these agencies, representing a 
millions market across the whole world for many items. For that reason the UN is continually 
researching cooperative purchasing opportunities and trying to harmonise the total procure-
ment system on several organisational levels. For instance by facilitating e-procurement 
solutions to cooperative purchasing (i.e. http://www.unwebbuy.org) or collecting long term 
agreements from individual agencies and making them available for the total UN system. 
Cooperative purchasing initiatives are considered to be an important source of cost savings, 
resources, and learning opportunities in the UN system. Few organisations have all of the 
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resources on their own needed to function effectively in the current dynamic landscape 
(Ireland, 2002).  
Common principles are applicable throughout the system. The most significant 
common denominator for the UN system is that it operates with public funds (Harland, 2003). 
However, there is no single line of control for procurement within the UN. For that reason, the 
success of cooperation depends on persuasion, networking, and partnerships, which is making 
it more difficult for the UN to benefit optimally from its substantial buying leverage.  
 
Research objectives 
 
The objectives of this paper are to describe current practices of cooperative purchasing in the 
UN, to define common forms of cooperation, and to identify and rank critical factors and 
reasons (not) to cooperate from small to large agencies. The first objective applies to the 
specific context of the UN. The other objectives apply to cooperative purchasing in general in 
the public sector, being relevant both to the theoretical and practical development of 
cooperative purchasing.  
This paper is part of the empirical part of a PhD-project concerning horizontal coope-
rative purchasing. For this research project we recognise an empirical and an analytical 
approach. The empirical approach serves as an inspiration, validation, and background for the 
analytical approach. More specific, the empirical approach recognises three theory career 
stages: discovery (Reichenbach, 1938), pursuit, (Laudan, 1977) and justification (Reichen-
bach, 1938). We discuss our approach in this paper into more detail in the next section.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to get a more complete understanding of cooperative purchasing within the UN we 
first carried out several interviews at the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) 
of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the context of discovery and 
pursuit. IAPSO serves as a focal point for the UN system on (cooperative) procurement issues 
(UNDP, 1998).  
Based on these first interviews and several other studies related to working together 
(Aylesworth, 2003; Doucette, 1997; Essig, 2000; Hendrick, 1997; Major, 1997; Nollet, 2001; 
Pye, 1996; Sickinger, 1996; Virolainen, 2003; Walker, 2004) we built a draft questionnaire 
with a mix of question types in the context of pursuit and justification. The questionnaire was 
first sent to a focus group to test the questions. After this step the questionnaire was sent to all 
members of the United Nations Inter Agency Procurement Working Group (UN/IAPWG), 
consisting of the heads of procurement across 47 UN agencies. 19 questionnaires (excluding 
IAPSO) were returned, representing a response rate of 40% (see table 1). Because of lacking 
data regarding the number of (procurement) personnel of several UN agencies we categorised 
the agencies according to their annual procurement volume.  
The final phase of our study consisted of a report of the survey for all the UN heads 
of procurement, and a presentation of the findings at a workshop at the 29th annual UN/ 
IAPWG meeting. The topic cooperative purchasing is a recurring item on the agenda of this 
meeting to initiate and evaluate cooperative initiatives. The final report of the study was 
distributed to all UN/IAPWG members with a final request for feedback on any perceived 
discrepancies and on key issues to compensate for nonresponse bias and possible misinter-
pretations. This paper was distributed to IAPSO to verify the final empirical and analytical 
results. 
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Table 1: Total procurement by UN agencies in 2003 
 
Cate-
gory 
annual procurement number of 
agencies 
% of total 
procurement 
respondents 
large > 150 million USD  8 (17%) 80% 5 (63%) 
medium 10 < 150 16 (34%) 19% 6 (38%) 
small < 10 23 (49%) 1% 8 (35%) 
total  47 (100%) 100% 19 (40%) 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
In this section we describe and discuss the results from our study. Without going into detail we 
first give some information about the contextual factors of the respondents. Most UN agencies 
(74%) are already actively involved in cooperative purchasing initiatives. All large agencies 
(100%) are active in one or more collaborative initiatives. Large agencies are involved in more 
cooperative initiatives than small agencies (significant difference between the means of the 
normal distributed scores with unequal variances at p=0,051 in an independent samples 2-
tailed t-test). Indicated reasons are that large agencies have more resources, and purchase more 
and different products and services. 
Most UN agencies indicated being interested in sharing purchasing information 
(74%) and (supplier) experiences (89%). 64% of the cooperative initiatives is growing in 
purchasing volume, 21% is stable and 14% is shrinking in size. Growing initiatives have the 
overhand in all categories from small to large agencies. Parts of these results are confirmed by 
an earlier study by Harland (2003). Harland found that 76% of the IAPWG member agencies 
use shared contracts, and 47% lead contracts on behalf of other UN agencies. Table 2 shows 
more contextual factors of the responding agencies.  
 
Table 2: Contextual factors of the responding agencies (n=19) 
 
factor dscription 
respondents Most respondents have the job title head or chief procurement (69%). Some 
of the respondents from small (25%) and medium sized (20%) agencies are 
directors. 
procurement 
personnel 
84% indicated that they have less than 10 strategic FTEs in the procurement 
function. 79% indicated having less than 20 tactical FTEs and 40 operational 
FTEs. 
purchasing spend 
under control 
All large agencies indicated having reasonable (61 - 80%) to good control 
(81 - 100%) over their purchasing spend. Most small agencies (75%) also 
indicated a good control. Medium agencies score somewhat lower (33% 
good control, 33% reasonable control).  
assessment of 
purchasing 
competence 
42% of the respondents indicated having a better purchasing competence 
than most others. 42% indicated being even very good.  
organisational 
structure 
Almost all small agencies are organised centrally. Medium and large 
agencies are organised decentral with lead buyers or are organised centrally. 
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Forms of cooperative purchasing 
 
To be able to categorise and analyse forms of cooperative purchasing we propose a framework 
as shown in figure 1 (Schotanus, 2004). Intensiveness on the vertical axis is defined as the 
extent to which an organisation is compelled to perform an ‘active’ role in the cooperative 
initiative. The number of activities on the horizontal axis ranges from undertaking one project 
to undertaking several projects within the same initiative. 
 
Figure 1: Forms of cooperative purchasing and typical potential advantages 
 
 Convoy 
economies of scale 
sharing information 
process improvement 
 
typical: exceptional 
project 
 
 F1-Team 
economies of scale 
sharing information 
process improvement 
 
typical: learning and 
standardisation 
 
intensiveness 
 
 Carpooling 
economies of scale 
sharing information 
process improvement 
 
typical: lead buying 
and specialisation 
 
 Hitchhiking 
economies of scale 
sharing information 
 
typical: quick wins and 
piggy-backing 
 Bus Rides 
economies of scale 
sharing information 
 
typical: third party 
 
  
number of cooperative activities 
 
 
We identified each of the forms within the UN. The most popular forms are carpooling, 
hitchhiking, and bus rides. Carpooling involves ‘outsourcing’ the procurement of some items 
to a partner: each item is purchased by the most suitable agency or external party. Hitchhiking 
involves agencies establishing contracts on their own specifications, which may be used by 
other agencies. Bus rides usually involve long term hitchhiking made possible by IAPSO or 
external parties. IAPSO may establish agreements for common items on behalf of and for use 
through e-procurement or direct use by the entire UN. The bidding process is based on the 
aggregate procurement volume, in close cooperation with the respective major UN buyers 
(Harland, 2003). Other typical examples of bus rides are i.e. regional purchasing agencies 
(Aylesworth, 2003). Intensive cooperation forms usually involve agency representatives 
meeting regularly to discuss cooperative projects. These projects regularly involve some 
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representatives of all partners and together they carry out several steps of the procurement 
process. Intensive cooperation forms are uncommon in the UN. Indicated reasons are organi-
sational dissimilarities, large mutual distances, and related coordination costs. 
Each of the forms (or combinations) has its own critical factors and typical potential 
(dis)advantages. With increasing advantages, disadvantages also tend to increase. Some items 
suit very well with certain forms and certain forms suit very well with certain organisation 
types and their (top) management support. The cooperative procurement of a common item as 
i.e. electricity usually suits well with less intensive cooperation forms. More specific goods 
and services as temporary employment usually suit well with more intensive forms of 
cooperative purchasing. Furthermore, the optimal number of participating organisations in one 
initiative usually decreases with an increasing intensiveness, as coordination costs typically 
tend to increase more than linear. The degree to which an organisation can influence 
specifications will usually increase with an increasing intensiveness. Especially in intensive 
cooperation forms it is highly important to select the right partners (Ireland, 2002). 
 
The hitchhikers’ dilemma 
 
Large agencies generally profit less from hitchhiking on contracts from other agencies, as 
more specific contracts might be necessary or contracts based on the aggregate procurement 
volume might be more interesting. Small agencies are often involved with bus rides or 
hitchhiking, as they lack economies of scale on their own. Thus for small agencies it can be 
very interesting to hitchhike on contracts from large agencies (Schotanus, 2004). However, for 
large agencies there may be no direct incentive to allow small agencies to hitchhike on their 
contracts. We define this dilemma as the hitchhikers’ dilemma. A savings allocation 
mechanism could compensate this issue and stimulate the hitchhiking concept. Compensation 
could take place by allocating some of the cooperative gains of the smaller agencies to the 
larger ones, making hitchhiking also interesting for larger agencies (Schotanus, 2004). 
 
Reasons (not) to purchase cooperatively 
 
Purchasing together can be explained by several theories as transaction cost economics, 
resource-based view or organisational learning theory (Ireland, 2002). Specific motives based 
on different theoretical concepts for working together are shown in table 3. This table shows 
the motives (not) to purchase cooperatively within the UN. The categories and related 
elements are based on the work of several authors (Arnold, 1982, Hendrick, 1997; Inkpen, 
2000; Ireland, 2002; Nollet, 2003; Rozemeijer, 2003). Here we do not distinguish between the 
several cooperation forms, the correlations between the reasons, and the time factor.  
Avoidance of parallel competition on key items at peaks of emergencies is not included in 
the table, but is also indicated as an important reason to work together. Another reason not 
specifically mentioned in the table is reducing tender process time. When purchasing a new 
item X several procedures have to be taken care of. When hitchhiking on a contract for item X 
from another agency these procedures are not necessary.  
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Table 3: Indicated reasons (not) to purchase cooperatively (n=17) 
 
Reasons to purchase cooperatively  S        M        L _ Reasons not to purchase cooperatively  S           M        L 
utilising economies of scale   expecting costs to be high or lacking resources 
1. lower prices 4,8 4,4 5,0  16. satisfied with current suppliers 3,5  3,3 3,5 
2. lower transaction costs  4,5 4,3 5,0  17. expecting costs to be high 2,8  4,0 2,5 
3. strengthen negotiation positions 4,2 4,5 4,6  18. lacking resources 3,3  3,0 2,0 
4. reduce workload* (M>S) 3,5 4,8 4,2  19. changing suppliers too expensive 2,8  2,3 2,3 
5. spread and reduce (supply) risks 4,0 3,3 3,3  20. we are a small player* (S>L) 3,2  2,3 1,0 
6. because of budget cuts* (S and M>L) 3,2 4,0 1,5  loosing flexibility or control 
sharing information or knowledge  21. decreased flexibility 3,4  3,3 2,8 
7. share prices and related information 4,2 4,6 3,8  22. loose control 3,2  4,0 2,5 
8. share experiences with suppliers 4,2 4,0 3,5  lacking trust, support or culture 
improving internal processes or sharing resources  23. no committing organisation** (S>L) 3,5  2,8 2,0 
9. learn from other agencies 4,0 4,3 3,8  24. no cultural support 2,5  2,0 3,0 
10. improve suppliers collectively 3,8 4,3 3,8  25. no organisational support* (S>L) 3,3  2,3 1,8 
11. gain access to procurement expertise 3,3 4,2 3,8  26. no trust in others' competence 2,8  2,7 2,0 
12. specialise in typical items 3,0 4,3 3,0  27. no management support** (S>L) 3,0  2,3 1,8 
13. extend collaboration to other fields  3,5 3,2 2,5  28. disclosure of sensitive information 2,6  2,3 2,0 
14. cooperating as a means to reorganise 3,0 3,0 2,3  29. antitrust (legal) issues 2,4  2,5 2,0 
15. lacking own specific knowledge 2,0 3,3 3,0  30. fear of parasites 2,3  2,7 1,8 
 31. supplier resistance 1,4  2,5 1,8 
 unknown with cooperative purchasing concept***
 32. did not have the opportunity** (S>L)  3,5  3,0 1,3 
 33. did not discuss the concept 3,0  2,8 1,8 
note: measured on a five point Likert scale from  
1 (unimportant) to 5 (important) 
*significant difference between mean ratings of  
normal distributed scores of small (S), medium (M) 
and large (L) agencies at p<0,05, or **p<0,1 in a 
post hoc LSD-test  34. concept has no priority
* (S and M>L) 2,8  3,0 1,0 
***the 3 reasons are correlated to some extent: Spearman’s coefficient> 0,720 at the 0,01 level (1-tailed) 
 
Some significant differences are found between the mean ratings of small, medium, and large 
agencies. Interesting differences concern organisational commitment (23), support (25 and 
27), and lack of opportunity and priority (32 and 34). These reasons not to work together are 
more important to small agencies than larger ones. This is notable given the hitchhikers’ 
dilemma. When reasoning from this dilemma, small agencies should embrace cooperative 
purchasing. Apparently other aspects also play a role in the UN context. More research will be 
necessary to study the influence of these aspects as loosing flexibility (21) and control (22). 
Smaller agencies might i.e. be more vulnerable to these reasons than large ones. 
We also found several significant differences between the mean ratings of agencies 
not involved (A; n=3) and involved (B; n=13) in cooperative initiatives. Surprising differences 
are found at the p=0,05 level with expensiveness of changing suppliers (reason 19; mean 
B=2,9; mean A=1,3), and expecting costs to be high (17; B=3,6; A=1,3). Apparently these 
aspects are not important reasons for group A not to purchase cooperatively. Differences are 
found as well with lacking opportunity (32; A=4,5; B=2,1; p<0,05), lacking priority (34; 
A=3,5; B=2,0; p<0,1), and lacking management support (27; A=3,0; B=2,2; p<0,1). These 
reasons might explain why group A does not purchase cooperatively.  
 
Critical success factors 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of perceived critical factors for managing cooperative 
initiatives. This analysis does not focus on different forms of cooperative purchasing, the 
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organisational structure of consortia, the correlations between the factors, and the time factor. 
Just one significant difference was found between the mean ratings of small, medium and 
large agencies. This concerns the factor achieving integral savings (3).  
 
Table 4: Indicated critical factors for managing cooperative initiatives (n=13) 
 
Viewpoint cooperative initiative    S           M          L _ Viewpoint individual agencies  S           M       L 
1. choose the right products and services 4,8 4,7 4,8 14. organisational support 4,3  5,0 4,5
2. mutual trust and an open relationship 3,8 5,0 5,0 15. need and will to cooperate 4,8  4,3 4,5
3. achieve integral savings* (S and L>M) 4,8 3,3 4,6 16. competent purchasing organisation 4,8  4,3 4,5
4. communicate and keep up-to-date 3,8 4,3 4,5 17. sufficient resources 4,5  4,7 4,3
5. performance measurement** 4,2 4,0 4,4 18. dedication, commitment 4,5  4,3 4,5
6. voluntarily participation 3,8 4,7 4,0 19. (top) managerial support 4,7  4,3 4,3
7. similar organisation and philosophy 4,2 4,3 3,5 
8. be able to deal with supplier resistance 3,4 4,0 4,0 
9. promote successes and quick wins 3,8 3,7 3,8 
10. commit appointments to paper 3,2 3,7 4,3 
11. costs and gains allocation 
mechanisms 
3,6 4,0 3,3 
12. safeguards to prevent antitrust issues 3,4 3,3 2,5 
13. consortium not too large or small 3,2 3,0 3,2 
 
note: measured on a five point Likert scale from  
1 (unimportant) to 5 (important) 
*significant difference between mean ratings of  
normal distributed scores of small (S), medium (M) 
and large (L) agencies at p<0,1 in a post hoc LSD-test 
**performance measurement is considered more  
important when a cooperative initiative becomes older 
 
 
First of all we emphasise the importance of choosing the right items (1). Most of the literature 
in this area focuses on factors such as trust (2), similarity (7), and support (14, 18, and 19) (i.e. 
Hendrick, 1997; Hoffmann, 2001; Ireland, 2002). Our results do confirm that to maximise 
cooperation among the partners a trust-based relationship must be developed (Ireland, 2002). 
Lacking trust is however not indicated as an important reason not to work together (see 
reasons 29 and 30 in table 3). Therefore it is indicated that antitrust safeguards are just neu-
trally important. Nollet and Beaulieu found the same results in an empirical study in the public 
sector (2003). To the contrary, Hendrick found in his study in the private sector that 
safeguards are important in that context (1997). Thus the factor antitrust safeguards seems less 
important in the context of the public sector than the private sector. 
The indicated importance of allocation mechanisms (11) seems low. Especially as it 
is indicated that some agencies have to deal with the burden of some initiatives, have higher 
transaction costs and administrative issues, and lower savings. These effects could be 
compensated by using a commonly accepted allocation mechanism. However, the respondents 
experienced difficulties with reaching agreement on the allocation rates. Further research to 
these aspects of allocation mechanisms will be necessary.  
All individual organisational factors are on average indicated as important. It is 
remarkable that having a competent purchasing organisation (16) is also indicated as impor-
tant. Especially agencies with a ‘lesser developed’ purchasing organisation could learn and 
gain from collaborative initiatives. These gains could be divided among all participants. It is 
important that at least one of the participating agencies acts as a champion (18). Support, 
commitment, and competence should be high for this agency. Table 4 shows moreover that it 
is not only important to take care of the organisation of the consortium itself, but also that the 
individual agencies should take care of relevant internal issues. These individual issues apply 
particularly to intensive forms of cooperation. Finally, both content-oriented and process-
oriented factors play an important role in cooperative purchasing.  
Significant differences between the mean ratings of agencies not involved (A; n=2) 
and involved (B; n=11) in cooperative initiatives are found with several factors. At the p=0,05 
level we found that achieving integral savings (3) is more important to group A (mean=5,0) 
than B (mean=4,3). Differences are also found with organisational support (14; B=4,7; A=4,0) 
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and sufficient resources (17; B=4,6; A=4,0). Of course our sample is small, but a study by 
Hoffmann and Schlosser among SMEs confirms our results (2001).  
At the p=0,15 level we found that committing appointments to paper (10) is more 
important to group B (mean=3,9) than A (mean=2,5). Hoffmann and Schlosser also found in 
their strategic alliances study that the precise definition of rights and duties was not noticed by 
10,9% of the successful companies and 46,7% of the unsuccessful companies (2001). On the 
other hand, Hendrick found in his study that formal written agreements are not very important 
to organisations involved in consortia, while those with no consortium experience are of the 
opinion they are an important factor (1997). Again, more research to i.e. the contextual factors 
will be required to explain these differences.  
 
Products and services purchased cooperatively 
 
As choosing the right items is indicated as an important factor we discuss this topic into some 
more extent in this final section. Appendix A shows the items purchased cooperatively within 
the UN. Most of these items belong to the major items procured by the UN. Both low value 
and high quantity items and high value and low quantity items are indicated as suitable for 
cooperative purchasing. For most of the items cooperative UN initiatives already exist. 
However, some interested agencies are not yet part of these initiatives.  
Figure 2 gives the indicated properties that make products suitable for cooperative 
purchasing within the UN system. A remarkable outcome concerns items being required on an 
ongoing basis (4). Items not required on an ongoing basis are purchased cooperatively in 
several Dutch initiatives (Schotanus, 2004). Here the total savings are proven be high as none 
of the partners possesses enough skills on their own for purchasing these exceptional items. 
The restrictions are that all partners should have similar needs in a certain time frame and the 
gains should outweigh the costs. The costs may be relatively high as these kinds of projects 
are usually onetime events and setup costs cannot be spread over multiple projects. We 
interpret the stability property (5) by assuming that consortia usually respond slower to market 
changes than individual agencies, because it may be more difficult to reach consensus. 
 
Figure 2: Indicated properties that make products suitable  
for cooperative purchasing (n=13) 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Programme activity synergy in various agencies. 8
No preference for local supplier items. 7
Geographical availability of items. 6
Stable markets. 5
Items which are required on an ongoing basis. 4
Standardised or not customised items. 3
Total gains should outweigh (coordination) costs. 2
Similar needs, requirements or specifications. 1
Percentage of respondents that mentioned the property
 
 
 
Conclusion 
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This paper notes (1) several cooperation forms, (2) motives to cooperate, and (3) critical 
factors for cooperative purchasing. First, one specific form of cooperation concerns hitchhi-
king (a.k.a. piggy-backing). The hitchhikers’ dilemma deals with small agencies hitchhiking 
on contracts from large agencies. For large agencies there may be no incentive to allow 
hitchhiking. For small agencies it can be very interesting to hitchhike though. Savings alloca-
tion mechanisms could compensate this dilemma and stimulate working together.  
Second, important reasons to work together turn out to be lower prices and transac-
tion costs, sharing information, and learning. Reasons not to work together are i.e. lacking 
organisational commitment and support. Those are more important to small agencies than 
large ones. This is notable given the hitchhikers’ dilemma. When reasoning from this 
dilemma, small agencies should support working together. Another difference is found with 
expecting costs to be high. This aspect is more important to agencies involved in cooperative 
initiatives (group B) than those that are not involved (group A). Differences are found as well 
with lacking opportunity or priority to purchase together. These reasons are more important to 
group A than B and might explain why group A does not purchase cooperatively.  
Third, most of the literature in the area of critical factors focuses on factors such as 
trust and support. Based on our study, we emphasize that choosing the right products and 
services is also important. The results show furthermore that it is not only important to take 
care of the organisation of the cooperative initiative itself, but also that the individual agencies 
should take care of relevant internal issues. The factor antitrust safeguards seems less 
important in the context of the public sector than the private sector. The factors organisational 
support, sufficient resources, and committing appointments to paper are more important to 
group B than A. Hoffmann and Schlosser found the same results in their study (2001). 
Hendrick on the other hand, found that written agreements are not very important to organi-
sations involved in consortia, while those with no consortium experience indicate it as an 
important factor (1997).  
Of course our sample is specific and small (n ≤ 19). Therefore more research will be 
necessary for justification in common practice. However, in the context of (internationally 
operating) public organisations the results are still very relevant. Our further research will 
involve i.e. studying successful and unsuccessful consortia. We also plan to investigate the 
relationship between flexibility and control, savings allocation mechanisms and related 
fairness of allocation rates, and other critical factors for small and large organisations. 
 
 
 
Appendix A:  
Products and services purchased cooperatively 
 
 
product or service 
(n=19) 
purchased 
cooperatively 
by 
new interested 
agencies 
total2 nd and 
3rd column 
purchased  
by 
degree of 
interest  
telecom services / equipment 32% 32% 63% 81% 4,3 
computer software 37% 11% 47% 96% 4,4 
air plane tickets and 
transportation 21% 21% 42% no data 4,8 
computer hardware 21% 21% 42% 96% 4,6 
motor vehicles / parts 21% 21% 42% 92% 4,1 
office supplies 16% 26% 42% 92% 4,0 
medical equipment / supplies 21% 16% 37% 54% 4,3 
paper (products) 21% 16% 37% 88% 4,2 
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insurances 16% 21% 37% no data 4,0 
security services 21% 16% 37% no data 3,8 
delivery services 11% 21% 32% 73% 4,3 
freight forwarding / logistics 11% 16% 26% 73% 4,5 
copiers 5% 21% 26% 88% 4,4 
fuel or oil (products) 11% 16% 26% 50% 3,7 
office furnishing 16% 11% 26% 92% 3,2 
cleaning services 11% 11% 21% no data 3,7 
internet access 5% 16% 21% no data 3,6 
vaccines 16% 5% 21% 46% 3,5 
electronic data process service 11% 11% 21% 77% 3,5 
contraceptives 16% 5% 21% 31% 3,0 
technical services 11% 11% 21% no data 2,8 
shelter items 5% 11% 16% 31% 4,3 
electricity 5% 11% 16% no data 3,5 
laboratory equipment / 
services 11% 5% 16% 50% 3,0 
pharmaceuticals 11% 5% 16% 58% 2,8 
subscriptions 5% 11% 16% no data 2,8 
building / construction 
services 5% 5% 11% 81% 3,0 
water (supply systems) 5% 5% 11% 31% 2,8 
syringes / needles 5% 5% 11% 46% 2,0 
 
The 2nd column indicates how many agencies purchase these items cooperatively in the current situation. 
The 3rd column indicates how many agencies are (very) interested in joining a new or existing 
cooperative initiative for this item. The 4th column indicates how many of all UN agencies approximately 
purchase these items, individually or cooperatively. The final column indicates the average scores of 
how interested the respondents are in collaborative initiatives for these products. This column was 
measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (not interested) to 5 (interested). 
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